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INTRODUCTION
1

Since Gregor Mendel discovered the gene, scientists have
sought to unravel the intricacies of life’s blueprint—the genetic
2
code.
Today, insights into molecular biology and genetic
3
engineering fuel biotechnology, an industry promising to touch
4
every aspect of human life. Already, biotechnology has enabled
major advances in medical therapeutics and diagnostics, and has
5
6
spawned complex new fields such as genomics and proteomics.
Given the major role of gene-based technologies in
biotechnology, gene patents are among a biotechnology company’s
7
most valuable assets. Patents are government issued grants providing
∗
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1
See infra text accompanying notes 47-50 for a discussion of Mendel’s work.
2
See infra Part II for a discussion of the scientific discoveries that enabled the
deciphering of the genetic code.
3
Genetic engineering involves the use of processes (i.e., genetic manipulation,
genetic modification, genetic technology, recombinant DNA technology) to move
genes from one organism to another, often to solve medical or agricultural
problems, with the goal of creating organisms with novel genetic make-ups. MICHAEL
J. REISS & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE? 1, 2 (1996).
4
Examples of biotechnology’s focus on genetics include the development of
genetically engineered organisms that remove hazardous waste from the
environment, the development of animals that make human products such as
insulin, and the development of genetically engineered drugs for treating heart
disease, cancer, AIDS, and strokes. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY:
HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE WORLD 15-24 (1998).
5
The goal of genomics is to study the functions and interactions of all genes in
the genome. See Alan Guttmacher & Francis Collins, Genomic Medicine: Genomic
Medicine-A Primer, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1512, 1513 (2002).
6
Proteomics involves the study of proteins, their biological functions, and the
mechanisms by which they interact. HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH E. POWERS, IP
STRATEGY: COMPLETE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLANNING, ACCESS, AND PROTECTION §
4:21 (2002).
7
RIFKIN, supra note 4, at 37 (referring to genes as the “green gold” of
biotechnology).
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their owner the right to exclude others from “making, using, offering
8
for sale, or selling [their] invention” for a period of twenty years
9
from the date of filing. In offering protection, patents also create
10
incentives. Barring exclusion, competitors could copy a patented
invention and undersell the patent owner, who, unlike the
11
competition, has incurred research and development costs. The
right of exclusion, however, prevents competitors from “making,
12
using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention. In so
doing, the exclusionary right provides opportunity for economic
recovery and gain, which in turn creates incentives to invest the time,
effort, and money necessary for the creation of new and useful
13
products.
The importance of obtaining patent protection for commercially
valuable genes has created a race to the United States Patent and
14
Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
Given the pressure to file first,
biotechnology companies often choose to file broad patent
applications in the early stages of research, before they understand
15
the commercial applications of their inventions. Biotechnologists
defend these broad filings, arguing that limiting their patents to the
“specific and narrow” lab results will make cost recovery an
16
impossibility.
Legal commentators, clinicians, and researchers,
however, argue that gene patents have the real potential of
undermining biomedical research, health care, and the free
17
exchange of information among researchers. For instance, a gene
patent holder may lawfully prevent the scientific community from
conducting research or developing valuable therapeutic applications
18
based on the patented gene’s DNA sequence. Even when the patent
holder is willing to license the gene or DNA sequence, the cost of
19
acquiring the license can be prohibitive.
This Comment explores the key role American patent law plays,

8

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
10
CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 70-76 (2d ed. 2001).
11
Id. at 69.
12
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001).
13
See CHISUM ET AL, supra note 10, at 70-76.
14
See RIFKIN, supra note 4, at 59.
15
ERIC S. GRACE, BIOTECHNOLOGY UNZIPPED: PROMISES AND REALITIES 204 (1997).
16
See id.
17
See infra Part IV for an in-depth examination of the policy issues surrounding
the issuance of gene patents.
18
See Part IV.A.
19
See id.
9
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and must continue to play, in preventing the ills associated with
broad gene patents. Part I offers a basic explanation of genes and
their functions. Part II provides an introduction to the biotechnology
industry. This section examines the history of biotechnology with an
emphasis on current technology and the scientific goals of the
industry. Part III gives an overview of the American patent system.
Part IV considers both the negative and positive implications of
issuing gene-based patents. Also, this section briefly discusses various
options for lessening the negative effects of gene patents. Part V
suggests that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit adopt a biotechnology-specific application of the
foreseeability standard articulated in Judge Rader’s concurrence in
20
Johnson & Johnston Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc. Under this
21
objective foreseeability-based limit on the doctrine of equivalents,
the patent applicant “has an obligation to draft claims capturing all
22
reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention,” and may not
rely on the doctrine of equivalents to capture “subject matter that the
23
patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen,” but failed to claim.
Judge Rader advocated the foreseeability standard as a general,
24
rather than biotechnology-specific, patent law principle.
This
section, however, argues for a biotechnology-specific application of
25
the foreseeability standard. It posits that applying a heightened,
more restrictive version of the doctrine of equivalents in
biotechnology cases will effectively limit gene patent scope, thereby
26
promoting biotechnological progress.

I.

THE GENE

This Comment aspires to offer an in-depth examination of the
challenges that gene patents pose, and the manner in which courts
have and should continue to limit gene patent scope. However, in
order to appreciate a gene’s scientific value, gene patent case law,
20

285 F.3d 1046, 1056-59 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (Rader, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with the court’s decision, but arguing that the court should
have decided the issue under a foreseeability approach to the doctrine of
equivalents).
21
See infra text accompanying notes 131-42 for a discussion of the doctrine of
equivalents.
22
Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring).
23
Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
24
See id. at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring).
25
See infra Part V.
26
See id.
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and the philosophical questions surrounding gene patents, it is
helpful to comprehend the structure and function of the gene itself.
Deoxyribonucleic acid, also known as DNA, is the primary
27
repository for genetic information in the human body.
DNA is
28
29
located on chromosomes, which are located in a cell’s nucleus.
Although it may be difficult to understand the function of DNA,
30
“[its] structure is really quite simple.”
DNA, in its double helix form, resembles a twisted rope ladder.
The rope element (a strand) is composed of alternating molecules of
31
sugar and phosphate. Each step of the ladder is composed of a pair
32
of bases (nucleotides) joined by chemical bonds. There are four
such bases: G (guanine), T (thymine), C (cytosine) and A
33
(adenine). The bases are complementary in that they always pair up
34
the same way: A with T, and C with G. Thus, each step of the ladder
35
is either an A-T, T-A, C-G or G-C.
More importantly, the
complementary nature of the bases means that the sequence of bases
on one strand always complements the sequence along the other
36
strand in the same way.
DNA’s incredible ability to store information lies in the bases,
37
the arrangement of which makes up a gene.
A useful way to
visualize a gene is as follows: imagine splitting the ladder in half down
the middle, so as to separate each base pair. Now, imagine walking
38
up one of the ropes, “reading off the bases as you go.”
The
sequence of bases might read ATGCTCCG. Another section might
read an entirely different sequence of bases. Each section of bases is
39
a particular gene, the lengths and sequences of which vary.
Many people mistakenly believe that genes are the determinate

27

WAYNE BECKER ET AL., THE WORLD OF THE CELL 56 (3d ed. 1996).
Chromosomes are thread-like strands containing nucleic acids that are located
in a cell’s nucleus. Id. at 83.
29
The nucleus is the cell’s control center, located near the middle of the cell. Id.
at 89-99.
30
REISS & STRAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 13.
31
BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 60.
32
Id. at 60-61.
33
Id. at 61.
34
Id. at 60-61.
35
Id.
36
Thus, if one strand of the DNA contains the bases TAATCG, its complement
will read ATTAGC. Id. at 60-61.
37
GRACE, supra note 15, at 17.
38
Id.
39
Id.
28
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40

factor of our physical characteristics.
In actuality, genes do not
41
directly determine our physical features.
Rather, they are the
instructions for making proteins, the biological compounds directly
42
Proteins are “the very
responsible for making us what we are.
43
foundation of living systems,” and are involved with nearly every
44
product and process necessary for cell survival.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
Although the word “biotechnology” conjures up thoughts of
modern, cutting edge technology, its history dates back thousands of
45
years.
The roots of traditional biotechnology trace back 12,000
years, when humans independently domesticated plants and animals
46
in the Middle East, the Far East, and the Americas.
Such
domestication involved farmers selecting various plants and animals,
47
and breeding them to produce the largest and healthiest specimens.
One of the most prolific and important figures in the era of
48
traditional biotechnology was Gregor Mendel, the founder of the
study of genetics, which has enabled the success of modern
49
biotechnology.
While observing the common pea plant in his
monastery’s garden, Mendel made numerous important discoveries
50
known as Mendel’s laws of inheritance.
Importantly, Mendel
discovered that discrete “factors” (known today as genes) determine
51
the traits of most organisms.
The Twentieth Century scientific community witnessed
numerous landmark discoveries that paved the way for the era of
52
modern biotechnology.
Modern biotechnology is primarily
40

Id. at 18 (commenting that “[t]o the average person, a gene is something that
gives you, say, blue eyes or brown eyes”).
41
Id. at 20-25 (noting how genes code for proteins, which in turn are the
foundation of living systems).
42
Id. at 21.
43
GRACE, supra note 15, at 21.
44
Proteins’ functions are vast and varied. Id. at 21. Some of their functions
include carrying oxygen in the blood, carrying messages between cells, making up
muscle, activating the immune system, and activating essential chemical reactions by
acting as enzymes. Id.
45
REISS & STRAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 3.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 509.
49
See GRACE, supra note 15, at 6, 8.
50
BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 509.
51
Id.
52
See GRACE, supra note 15, at 28-29 (discussing monumental discoveries such as
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concerned with developing “commercially valuable therapeutic,
biomedical, and pharmaceutical products and processes . . . that
revolve around the manipulation of DNA molecules and their
53
encoded proteins.” What separates “modern biotechnology” from
“traditional biotechnology” is not the use of organisms to accomplish
54
goals, but rather the processes employed in doing so.
Modern
processes such as genetic engineering, specifically recombinant DNA
technology, allow biotechnologists to “reach further into the genetic
structure of organisms and to manipulate the building blocks of life
55
directly.”
Recombinant DNA technology involves isolating and replicating
the desired gene of one species and inserting it into the genome of
56
another species. Once transfected, the host cells become capable of
producing (“expressing”) the protein for which the foreign gene
57
For example, recombinant DNA technology makes it
codes.
possible for bacteria to mass produce lifesaving substances such as
human insulin, growth hormones and blood clotting factors,
58
previously available only in limited quantities.
Importantly,
recombinant DNA technology made the Human Genome Project a
59
reality.
Launched in 1990 by the Department of Energy and the
National Institute of Health, the Human Genome Project (“HGP”) is
a $250 million publicly funded international endeavor focused on
60
sequencing the entire human genome.
In 2001, the HGP
accomplished its first goal of mapping and sequencing all 100,000
61
genes of the human genome. The information, in the form of three
billion base pairs, is “enough to fill more than 200 telephone

the recognition that DNA carries genetic information, DNA’s helical structure, and
the use of restriction enzymes to cut and splice genetic material).
53
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 646.
54
GRACE, supra note 15, at 2.
55
See ANAWALT & POWERS, supra note 6.
56
BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 520-27.
57
Id.
58
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth & Linda J. Demaine, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 308
(2002) (presenting the manner in which gene patents harm research and
innovation, and suggesting a substantial transformation test that only allows
patenting of truly novel gene-based inventions).
59
See GRACE, supra note 15, at 69-70.
60
Mary Breen Smith, Comment, An End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome
Project Versus the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 747, 754 (2002).
61
See id. at 754-55.
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62

books.”
The next wave of research in understanding human
63
development and illness is proteomics. Whereas the HGP focused
on sequencing the entire human genome, proteomics seeks to
understand all proteins, their biological functions and the
64
mechanisms by which they interact. Involved in the pursuit of this
goal is the field of structural genomics, a subset of proteomics, which
seeks to uncover the biological functions of proteins through study of
65
their three-dimensional structure.
Although modern biotechnology’s applications are widespread,
66
“its greatest impact so far has been in healthcare.” Equipped with
the knowledge resulting from the Human Genome Project,
biotechnology companies are currently developing innovative drugs
67
and diagnostic tools. Since many medical ailments are created by
defective genes, knowledge of the location, structure and function of
these genes will allow researchers to develop drugs and diagnostic kits
that treat and diagnose disease at the genetic level, thus leading to
68
safer and more effective treatments.
Today, biotechnology companies, along with government and
corporate laboratories, are mapping and sequencing the genomes of
many species, from humans to bacteria, “with the goal of finding new
ways of harnessing and exploiting genetic information for economic
69
purposes.” Given the economic incentives, researchers will continue
to seek broad patent protection for their genetic and
70
biotechnological discoveries. It is the role of the Federal Circuit and
USPTO to maintain an appropriate level of patent protection that
creates incentives while also preventing overly broad gene patent
71
scope.
62

Id. at 754.
ANAWALT & POWERS, supra note 6.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, Comment, A Higher Nonobvious Standard for Gene
Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
143, 145 (2000) (arguing that given the detrimental effects of broad gene patents on
biomedical research, they should be made more difficult to obtain by means of a
heightened non-obvious standard) (quoting WILLIAM BAINS, BIOTECHNOLOGY FROM A
TO Z V (1993).
67
ANAWALT & POWERS, supra note 6.
68
Id.
69
RIFKIN, supra note 4, at 190.
70
See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 105-06 (1999).
71
See Clarisa Long, Side Bar: The Brouhaha Over Expressed Sequence Tags, in CHISUM
63

718

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:711

III. PATENT LAW BACKGROUND
DNA-based inventions have provided special problems for patent
law. In order to understand these challenges, including the issue of
broad gene patents, it is necessary to understand the American
patent law system.
The constitutional basis for the American patent law system is
found in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which
gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors
73
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
Given colonial usage and syntax, the clause can be reworked as
follows: (1) “To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for
limited times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings;
and (2) To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for
limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
74
Discoveries.” Although this interpretation highlights the framers’
intent of encouraging the useful arts, “it does not however, define the
exact nature of the patent grant, such as its appropriate balance or
75
scope, and subject matter.” The founding fathers left that duty to
76
77
Congress, which enacted the first patent statute in 1790. Since
then, Congress has enacted several statutory revisions leading up to
78
the 1952 Patent Act.
Under the 1952 Patent Act, an invention may only receive a
79
80
patent if it is “new and useful,” “novel” and “non-obvious” to a
81
person of ordinary skill in the art.
Furthermore, the patent
82
application’s specification must adequately disclose the invention to
72

ET AL.,

supra note 10, at 725 (noting that one of the most critical issues surrounding
the intersection of biotechnology and patent law is the appropriate scope of claims to
genetic material).
72
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 273.
73
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
74
Karl B. Lutz, A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949).
75
Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling
with the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1992).
76
Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
77
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 18.
78
See id. at 18-21 for a complete history of the patent statutes.
79
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
80
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001).
81
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001).
82
The specification consists of the written description and the claims. See
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 92. The written description provides background,
drawings, and a detailed description of the invention. See id. at 93-102. The claims
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83

the public.
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention must be “new and
84
useful.” “For an invention to be useful within the meaning of the
statute, a substantial and practical purpose must be discovered and
85
disclosed.” The utility requirement is part of the patent system’s
86
quid pro quo. In exchange for the right to exclude, the invention is
87
required to work for its intended purpose. Unlike mechanical and
electrical inventions, which often show an end result, proving utility
88
of biotechnology inventions is more difficult because biotechnology
89
inventions “possess an evolving utility,” and “are more like building
90
That is, many
blocks rather than a completed building.”
biotechnology inventions involve methods for producing
91
intermediary products or products with unknown results.
92
Under § 102, only novel inventions may be patented, ensuring
93
that the invention contributes something new to society.
To be
considered novel, the invention must not have been “known or used”
in the United States or “patented or described in a printed
94
publication” either in the United States or abroad.
In patent
95
terminology, an invention that is not new is anticipated by prior art.
That is, the prior art reference discloses every element of the
invention’s claims and enables one skilled in the art to make and use
96
the invention.
In addition to the novelty requirement, § 102
define the metes and bounds of the invention and as the “[f]ederal circuit has stated
time and again, ‘[c]laims are infringed, not specifications.’” Id. at 103 (quoting SRI
Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). A
patent application generally has numerous claims, which often vary in scope. See id.
at 104. Since the claims define the outer bounds of an invention, when we refer to
broad inventions, we are in fact referring to a patent with broad claims. Id. A broad
claim is one that lacks limitations, which results in a wider scope. Id.
83
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001).
84
35 U.S.C. § 101.
85
Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1061 (citing Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)).
86
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 707.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
93
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 323.
94
35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
95
Prior art is a term used in patent law that refers to all known technical
information. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 93. A patent’s novelty and obviousness
are judged in light of all known prior art. See id.
96
See id. at 400.
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contains a statutory bar forbidding patenting when, more than a year
before filing a patent application, “the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication” either in the United States or
abroad, or the invention was “in public use or on sale” in the United
97
States.
The non-obvious requirement of § 103 is referred to as “the most
98
significant obstacle that a patent applicant faces” and the “final
99
gatekeeper of the patent system.” The non-obvious requirement
serves to prevent the patenting of inventions that while novel, are not
100
that different from the prior art. An invention is non-patentable if,
based on all existing knowledge at the time of invention, those skilled
101
in the art would have considered the invention obvious. That is, a
single prior art reference does not disclose each and every limitation
in the claim (thus not novel), but a variety of references, when
combined, do contain all of the limitations and show the invention
102
was already in the public domain.
Further, in order for the
references to be combinable, they must suggest to a person of
ordinary skill in the art that he make the invention and that if made,
103
the invention will have a reasonable likelihood of success.
Finally, a patent specification must meet the disclosure
104
requirements of § 112.
These requirements provide that the
specification must (1) contain a “written description” that (2)
provides sufficient information to “enable” any person skilled in the
art to make or use the invention, and (3) sets forth the “best mode”
105
contemplated by the inventor of making the invention.
The
specification must also contain claims “particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
106
his invention.”
The first of the three requirements set forth in paragraph one of
107
§ 112 is that the specification contain a written description.
The
written description provides the technical and background
97

35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 514.
99
Id. (quoting ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW
1997)).
100
See id. at 515.
101
See Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1061.
102
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 514.
103
Id. at 584.
104
35 U.S.C. § 112.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
98

AND

POLICY 479 (2d ed.
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explanation necessary for one to read and understand the patent
108
application, including its claims. To satisfy the written description
requirement, the patentee need not describe the claimed subject
109
The description must, however, “clearly allow
matter exactly.
persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor]
110
invented what is claimed.”
Under the enablement requirement of § 112, the inventor must
set forth in the patent specification enough information to enable
one skilled in the art to make and use the invention without “undue
111
experimentation.”
Thus, in order for a patentee to receive the
right to exclude, he must show others how to make and use the
invention, presumably so competitors may improve upon the claimed
112
invention. Courts also use the enablement requirement as a claim
113
Broad claims must be supported by an equally
narrowing device.
broad enablement, and if they are not, the inventor has not taught
how to “make or use” the invention, and the non-enabled claims will
114
not be allowed.
Lastly, the first paragraph of § 112 requires that the specification
“set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
115
The best mode requirement ensures that the
his invention.”
116
inventor discloses the best way of carrying out his invention.
Its
purpose is to prevent inventors from obtaining patent protection
117
while keeping secret the best way to make their invention.

108

See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 212.
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing In re
Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
110
Id. at 1563 (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1012).
111
35 U.S.C. § 112. The term “undue experimentation” does not appear in the
statute, but it is well established that under the enablement requirement, the
specification must teach those skilled in the art to make and use the invention
without “undue experimentation.” Nat’l Recovery Technologies v. Magnetic
Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating “the scope of
enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of
what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue
experimentation”); see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(discussing the factors involved for considering whether a disclosure requires undue
experimentation).
112
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 162.
113
Id.
114
See id.
115
35 U.S.C. § 112.
116
Id.
117
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 193.
109
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A. Statutory Subject Matter
In addition to the patentability requirements, an invention must
fall within one of four statutorily defined classes of subject matter as
set forth in § 101: “processe[s], machine[s], manufacture[s] or
118
119
composition[s] of matter.”
the
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
Supreme Court broadly interpreted these classes to “include anything
120
under the sun that is made by man.”
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty is most noteworthy,
however, for its ruling that genetically engineered multi-cellular
121
organisms constitute patentable subject matter.
The Court
explained that genetically engineered bacteria was patentable
because the claim was not to a “hitherto unknown natural
phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity having a
122
distinct name, character, [and] use.”
Under the reasoning in Chakrabarty, “products of nature” are
patentable so long as the inventor has changed the product in some
non-naturally occurring way to conform to the statutory requirements
123
of the Patent Act. Modern courts will allow patents for genes and
DNA sequences “as long as the genetic materials are claimed in a
non-naturally occurring form, that is, as an isolated or purified
124
molecule.” Those seeking gene patents argue that their genes are
isolated and purified because they “have been manipulated to
eliminate the non-coding region[s]” found in the body’s DNA, while
125
still maintaining the same function.
B. Infringement
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), “whoever, without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention
126
during term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.” Because
118

35 U.S.C. § 101.
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
120
Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2399).
121
Id.
122
Id. at 310.
123
Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1067.
124
Id.
125
Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with
Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 71 (2002) (presenting the various
arguments for why gene patents should not be issued as a matter of law and policy).
126
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
119
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127

inventions are defined by their claims, courts compare the claims of
the accused device to the claims of the patented invention when
128
determining infringement issues.
The infringement analysis
129
First, courts determine whether
comprises two distinct inquiries.
130
the accused invention literally infringes.
That is, whether every
131
“limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused device.” If
the court does not find literal infringement, it next examines
132
whether there is infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents allows a court to find infringement
when the infringing device, although not literally infringing,
“performs substantially the same function” as the patented invention
133
The
“in substantially the same way, to obtain the same result.”
doctrine finds justification in the fact that “the language in the patent
claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe
134
with complete precision the range of its novelty.”
Given the
imprecise nature of language, an interpretation of patent claims
135
based on their literal terms would greatly diminish a patent’s value.
For this reason the scope of a patent “is not limited to its literal terms
136
but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described.”
137
Recently, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that “equivalents remain a firmly
138
entrenched part of the settled rights protected by the patent.”
In extending the protection available to the inventor, the
doctrine of equivalents also renders the true scope of a patent less
139
clear.
This, in turn, diminishes the notice function of claims by
127

See supra note 82.
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 830-83.
129
Robert P. Merges & Richard. R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 853 (1990).
130
Id.
131
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
132
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at 853.
133
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (quoting Union
Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
134
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kobyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002).
135
See id. (explaining that a literal interpretation would destroy a patent’s value by
allowing would-be infringers to escape liability by making minor, insubstantial
variations that do not literally infringe the patent).
136
Id. at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1854)).
137
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
138
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 733 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)).
139
See id. at 727 (noting “that by extending protection beyond the literal terms in
a patent, the doctrine of equivalents can create substantial uncertainty about where
128
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making it hard for competitors to examine a patent’s claims and
140
predict what does and does not infringe. To reduce the uncertainty
created by the doctrine, rules exist that forbid resort to the doctrine,
141
as a matter of law, under certain circumstances. “One of the most
142
important of these [rules] is prosecution history estoppel,” which
estops the patentee from using the doctrine of equivalents to
recapture subject matter surrendered during the patent’s
143
prosecution.
144
Recently, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., the
Supreme Court announced two key findings regarding the scope of
145
prosecution history estoppel.
First, the Court ruled that
prosecution history estoppel arises for any amendment related to
146
patentability, not just those to avoid the prior art.
Second, the
Court ruled that when a patentee narrows his claim by amendment,
he is presumed to have surrendered the subject matter lost through
147
amendment. As a result, the patentee may not invoke the doctrine
of equivalents to capture amended subject matter unless he can show
“that at the time of amendment one skilled in the art could not
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have
148
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”
the patent monopoly ends”).
140
Id.
141
Michael P. Sandonato & Carl. B. Wischhusen, What ‘Festo’ Portends, THE NAT’L
L. J., June 10, 2002, at A19.
142
The “prosecution history” is the record of proceedings between the patent
attorney and the examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
regarding the prosecution of the patent. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 109-16.
Patent prosecution is the process of obtaining a patent. Id. In many ways, patent
prosecution is a give and take between the patent attorney and the examiner, with
the examiner objecting (through a process called an office action) to certain parts of
the application (such as the claims as originally written) and the attorney acting to
rectify the objections through amendment. Id. For instance, as is often the case, an
examiner might reject a patent’s original claims as being too broad. Id. In response
to the office action, the patent attorney will amend and narrow the claims and
resubmit the application for approval. Id.
143
Sandonato & Wischhusen, supra note 141, at A19.
144
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
145
See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41.
146
Id. at 735-37.
147
Id. at 738-40. In adopting this approach, the Supreme Court overruled the
Federal Circuit’s “complete bar,” which permanently disallowed claims of
equivalence for any material surrendered during the patent’s prosecution. See Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
148
The Supreme Court offered three examples of how the patentee may
overcome the presumption: by showing that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the
time of amendment, by showing that the rationale for the amendment bears no
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent, or when there is some other
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IV. THE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF GENE PATENTS ON
INNOVATION, RESEARCH AND HEALTH CARE
Although gene patents have become a firmly entrenched part of
149
the patent system, “the wisdom of such action is now being
150
While biotechnologists argue that gene patents are
questioned.”
151
necessary to promote cost recovery and investment in new research,
numerous researchers, clinicians, legal commentators and politicians
152
feel otherwise. Particularly, they point to the deleterious effects of
gene patents on biomedical research, biotechnological innovation,
patient care and the free exchange of information among
153
researchers.
Although the examples illustrating the deleterious effects of
gene patents are numerous, they revolve around the same core
principle: the right of exclusion is particularly harmful with gene
patents because a gene patent gives its holder exclusive rights to the
154
gene, its sequence, and all of the gene’s derivatives.
Thus, the
reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have
described the insubstantial variation in question. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41.
149
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth & Linda J. Demaine, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 304
(2002) (noting that the USPTO now routinely grants, and the federal courts
routinely uphold, patents on naturally occurring genes, DNA fragments, and other
biochemicals).
150
Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3
NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 803 (2002) (discussing the mounting body of evidence
suggesting that gene patents are harming biomedical research and patient care); see
also Andrews, supra note 125 (presenting the various arguments for why gene patents
should not be issued as a matter of law and policy); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Michael
A. Heller, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698 (1998) (discussing how a proliferation of upstream patentees may deter
innovation by blocking downstream patentees from developing innovative
technologies); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating
the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783 (2000) (discussing how patent law
struggles to develop new tools for analyzing recent advances in DNA sequences);
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149 (presenting the manner in which gene patents
harm research and innovation and suggesting a substantial transformation test that
only allows patenting of truly novel gene-based inventions); Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra
note 66 (arguing that given the detrimental effects of broad gene patents on
biomedical research they should be made more difficult to obtain by means of a
heightened non-obvious standard). But see John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280
SCIENCE 689 (1998) (positing that despite arguments to the contrary, genetically
based patents are necessary to provide incentive to invest in and disclose DNA
research).
151
See GRACE, supra note 15, at 204.
152
See Andrews, supra note 125, at 66 (presenting various arguments for why gene
patents should not be issued as a matter of law and policy).
153
See supra note 150.
154
See Andrews, supra note 125, at 70-72; see also Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note
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patent holder may prevent potential competitors from conducting
any research or from developing any therapeutic applications based
155
on the gene’s DNA sequence.
Even when the patent holder is
156
willing to license, the costs can be “exorbitant.”
This situation is unique to gene patents because unlike drugs
and other devices, scientists often cannot design around gene
157
patents. Whereas a pharmaceutical company can design around a
drug patent by creating an alternative drug that treats the same
condition, the competitor of a gene patent holder has no such
158
option. In order to treat or diagnose a disease at the genetic level,
159
However,
a competitor needs access to the disease-causing gene.
the patent holder, arguably to the detriment of health care and
160
biotechnological innovation, controls access to the gene.
Recognizing the consequences of gene patent ownership, the
National Academy of Sciences has noted that broad gene patents
“might seriously impede the research and development necessary to
realize the promise of the human genome sequence in generating
161
significant new treatments and cures for human disease.”
A. Gene Patent Proliferation as a Deterrent to Innovation
The right of exclusion is particularly harmful in biotechnology
because biotechnological research and development involves the use
162
of fundamental, but often patented biochemicals,
such as genes,
163
164
ESTs, SNPs, and proteins. Today, given the proliferation of gene
149, at 413-21.
155
Andrews, supra note 125, at 70.
156
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 415-19 (commenting that because
fundamental biochemical products are needed for modern research and
development, patents on such products “may cause costs to accumulate to the point
where scientifically valuable research becomes infeasible for researchers or
inaccessible to large portions of the public”).
157
Andrews, supra note 125, at 78-79.
158
Andrews, supra note 150, at 805 (commenting that unlike technologies such as
the picture tube, which can be designed around, there are no alternatives to the
patented human genes needed for genetic diagnosis and gene therapy).
159
Id.
160
See supra note 150.
161
Letter from Bruce Alberts, President National Academy of Sciences, to
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (Mar. 22, 2000) (Comment 41 on the
Revised Utility Examination Guidelines), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/sol/comments/utiliguide/nas/pdf.
162
See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 420.
163
The USPTO surprised many in 1997 by announcing that it would grant patents
to small sections of genes lacking a known function, known as expressed sequence
tags (“ESTs”), where novelty, non-obviousness and utility are proven. Andrews, supra
note 125, at 83-84. EST’s are short cDNA sequences that lack a known function that
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related patents, a biotechnology company must first identify and
overcome, through licensing negotiations, every blocking patent its
165
research will infringe.
As a result, any one patent holder could
166
Even when the
derail the entire process by refusing to negotiate.
patent holder will negotiate, the costs of licensing are often
167
prohibitively high.
In effect, each blocking patent acts as “[a]nother tollbooth on
the road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the
168
pace of downstream biomedical innovation.” Although the cost of
overcoming one “tollbooth” may not present a problem, “the impact
of multiple tollbooths on downstream research . . . and costs can be
169
profound.”
Illustrating the reality of this situation, the Chief
Executive Officer of Human Genome Sciences noted that “[a]ny
company that wants to be in the business of using genes, proteins, or
antibodies as drugs has a very high probability of running afoul of
170
our patents.
From a commercial point of view, they are severely
171
constrained-and far more than they realize.”

scientists collect from expressed DNA. See Lawrence Kass & Michael Nitabach, A
Roadmap for Biotechnology Patents? Federal Circuit Precedent and the PTO’s New
Examination Guidelines, 30 AIPLA Q. J. 233, 245 (2002). If an EST is ever found to be
part of a valuable gene or code for a valuable protein, the patent holder may
prohibit others from conducting research, producing proteins, or developing drugs
that involve use of the EST’s sequence. Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1090-91.
164
Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) are areas in the human genome
differing from another by only one base pair. Rai, supra note 70, at 105-06. They are
of particular interest to scientists because of their potential utility in identifying
genes responsible for disorders such as “diabetes, hypertension, asthma, common
cancers, and major neuropsychiatric diseases.” Id. Currently, much of SNP research
is in its initial stages and the majority of newly discovered SNPs have not been linked
to identifiable diseases. Id. Consequently, many of the patent applications filed on
SNP research have been based on SNP’s of unknown function, for which the
commercial applications are not yet clear. Id.
165
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 414-21.
166
Andrews, supra note 125, at 85.
167
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 415-19 (commenting that because
fundamental biochemical products are needed for modern research and
development, patents on such products “may cause costs to accumulate to the point
where scientifically valuable research becomes infeasible for researchers or
inaccessible to large portions of the public”).
168
Id. at 414 (quoting Rebecca Eisenberg & Michael A. Heller, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998)).
169
Id. at 418.
170
Lawrence M. Fisher, The Race to Cash In on the Genetic Code, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1999, § 3, at 1.
171
Id.
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B. The Potential to Harm Health Care
Gene patents threaten to undermine the overall quality of health
172
care by preventing biomedical research and by decreasing the
173
Gene patents
quality and availability of diagnostic testing.
endanger biomedical research in numerous ways.
First, the
opportunity to patent discoveries has led to a decrease in the free
174
exchange of information once common among scientists.
Now,
researchers may delay publishing valuable information until their
175
patent rights are secured, which may take several years. As noted by
Lori Andrews, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law,
“scientists directly involved with commercializing their research [are]
three times more likely to delay publication and twice as likely to
176
In
refuse sharing research than scientists conducting basic work.”
another example offered by Andrews, progress in autism research has
been delayed because researchers have refused to share tissue
samples in an effort to be the first to find and patent the autism177
causing gene.
Another way in which gene patents harm biomedical research
178
is by preventing it altogether.
For instance, although numerous
mutations in the same gene are often responsible for certain diseases,
companies such as Athena Neuroscience Inc., which holds a patent
for the gene associated with Alzheimer’s Disease, forbid laboratories
179
other than their own from screening for mutations in the gene. As
a result, the chances of finding additional mutations are severely
diminished—a quite unfortunate result considering that knowledge
of such mutations could prove useful in diagnosing those who would
180
not otherwise be diagnosed.
A further example of this phenomenon offered by Professor
Andrews is the European patent for BRCA1, a gene implicated in
181
breast cancer. In 2001, the United States biotech company Myriad

172
173

See generally Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 66.
Andrews, supra note 125; see also Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 413-

22.
174

GRACE, supra note 15, at 205.
Andrews, supra note 125, at 79-81.
176
Id. at 80.
177
Andrews, supra note 150, at 804.
178
See Andrews, supra note 125, at 79; see also Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149,
at 415-21.
179
Andrews, supra note 150, at 804.
180
See Andrews, supra note 125, at 89.
181
Andrews, supra note 150, at 804.
175
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Genetics received the European patent on BRCA1.
The broad
patent covers “all methods for diagnosing breast cancer by comparing
a patient’s BRCA1 gene with the BRCA1 gene Myriad describes in its
183
patent.” After acquiring the patent, Myriad refused to allow French
184
doctors to test for the BRCA1 gene.
Instead, Myriad insisted on
185
French physicians allege
conducting all testing in its laboratory.
that Myriad’s test screens for only ten to twenty percent of potential
186
BRCA1 mutations.
However, additional tests aimed at identifying
the remaining mutations cannot be developed without infringing
187
This same patent prevented a Yale
Myriad’s broad patent.
researcher from continuing his breast cancer research due to fear of
188
infringing the license limitations on the patented gene.
189
Gene patents also impede the progress of pharmacogenomics.
Although many drugs only work on a percentage of users with a
particular genetic disposition, pharmaceutical companies may use
their gene patents to prevent customers from determining if the drug
190
is efficacious for them.
For example, even though genetic tests
could reveal for whom certain drugs will work, pharmaceutical
companies have prevented the development of such tests by
patenting the tests and refusing to develop or let anyone else develop
191
them. As a result, customers can only speculate whether their costly
192
drugs are compatible with their genetic make-ups.
The downstream costs of gene patents also threaten to decrease
193
access to gene-based diagnostics and therapeutics. On the road to
product development, biotechnology companies must overcome the

182

Id.
Id. (citing Declan Butler & Sally Goodman, French researchers take a stand against
breast cancer gene patent, 413 NATURE 95 (2001)).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
See id. (citing Gad et al., Identification of a large rearrangement of the BRCA1 gene
using color bar code on combed DNA in an American breast/ovarian cancer family previously
studied by direct sequencing, 38 J. MED. GENET. 388 (2001)).
187
Andrews, supra note 150, at 804.
188
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 417.
189
Andrews, supra note 150, at 804. Pharmacogenomics is “the application of
genomics to pharmaceutical research, using genome studies to identify genes that
account for differences in different individuals.”
Am. Med. Assoc.,
Pharmacogenomics, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2306.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2003).
190
Andrews, supra note 150, at 804.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 150, at 416-17.
183
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prohibitively high costs of numerous blocking patents.
Such costs
195
are likely passed on to consumers.
As a result, consumers face
196
decreased accessibility to valuable products, such as genetic testing.
As noted by Professor Andrews, this concern has recently become
197
reality in Canada.
The province of British Columbia has stopped
paying for genetic breast cancer testing because the health care
system could not afford to pay what Myriad, the owner of the patent,
198
was charging.
C. The Positive Attributes of Gene Patents
Recognizing the arguments against gene patents, John Doll, the
USPTO’s Director of Biotechnology Examination, argues that
199
isolated and purified DNA sequences must be patentable.
He
believes that “[w]ithout the incentive of patents, there would be less
investment in research, and scientists might not disclose their new
200
technologies to the public.”
He notes that such investment is
201
necessary for the survival of small biotech companies. In addition,
Doll compares the current controversy of gene patents to the
202
controversy surrounding polymer chemistry patents thirty years ago.
He reminds us that although commentators, fearing the destruction
of an industry, argued against broad claims to the building blocks of
203
basic polymers, no such destruction occurred.
Further, commentators posit that without gene patents,
204
biotechnology companies would turn to trade secret protection. As
a result, companies would refuse to disclose any information, which
would prove extremely harmful to biotechnology, an industry
205
dependent on the free exchange of information.
This in turn
would lead to duplicate work, as companies would be unwilling to

194

See supra pp. 726-727.
See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 416.
196
Id.
197
See Andrews, supra note 125, at 91.
198
Id.
199
Doll, supra note 150, at 689.
200
Id. at 690.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 689.
203
Id.
204
See Sheila R. Arriola, Biotechnology Patents After Festo: Rethinking the Heightened
Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 919, 947 (2002)
(arguing for relaxed standards of enablement and written description in light of the
Federal Circuit’s complete bar rule).
205
Id.
195
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license their technologies for fear of reverse engineering.
In the
end, the absence of disclosure could harm innovation by depriving
researchers of the building blocks necessary to further the current
207
state of the art.
D. Appropriate Solutions to the Gene Patenting Dilemma
The compelling arguments both for and against the issuance of
gene patents highlight the challenges facing courts, legislators and
208
policy makers alike.
Although the ill effects of gene patents on
209
research and health care are real, without such patents venture
210
capitalists may be less willing to invest in new technologies.
Such
lack of investment could make it difficult for small biotech companies
211
At the same time, the proliferation of gene-based
to succeed.
patents has created multiple “tollbooth[s] on the road to product
212
development.”
Even if small companies receive investment, the
prohibitively high cost of navigating through today’s intellectual
213
property minefield may very well prove disabling.
Further, gene
patents arguably have reduced the exchange of information among
214
researchers by delaying publication times. If such patents were not
in existence, however, companies might resort to trade secret
215
protection, thus precluding all disclosure.
In light of the complexities gene patents create, remedies are
needed that maintain a level of economic incentive without causing
216
significant harm to health care and biotechnological innovation.
Suggested alternatives include government encouragement of patent
217
218
pools, compulsory licensing schemes for researchers, and a “fair

206

Id. Reverse engineering involves “starting with the known product and
working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
207
Arriola, supra note 204, at 947.
208
According to Professor Andrews, commentators have proposed various
solutions to the gene patent dilemma, such as banning them altogether, patent
pools, and mandatory licensing. Andrews, supra note 125, at 67, 101-06.
209
See generally supra note 150.
210
See Doll, supra note 150, at 689; see also GRACE, supra note 15, at 204.
211
Doll, supra note 150, at 690.
212
Eisenberg & Heller, supra note 150, at 699.
213
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 413-23.
214
Andrews, supra note 125, at 79-81; see also GRACE, supra note 15, at 205 (noting
that broad gene patents “create[] possessiveness about basic information”) .
215
See Arriola, supra note 204, at 947.
216
See generally Andrews, supra note 125.
217
Id. at 101-03.
218
Id. at 103.
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use” exception for research involving genetic sequence information.
Others, recognizing the problem of broad patents in
220
have suggested patent law specific means of
biotechnology,
221
regulating gene patents, such as a higher non-obvious standard,
and a substantial transformation test that would only allow patenting
of gene-based inventions “transformed in such a way as to create a
new product that is substantially different in function from the
222
naturally occurring phenomenon.”
Recently, Judge Gajarsa of the
Federal Circuit noted the possible need for higher standards of
223
Consistent with those who
patentability in biotechnology cases.
advocate the creation of higher standards for biotechnology patents,
this Comment proposes a foreseeability-based restriction on the
224
doctrine of equivalents in biotechnology patent cases.
219

V. LIMITING GENE PATENT CLAIM SCOPE THROUGH A
BIOTECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC, FORESEEABILITY-BASED LIMITATION ON THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Recognizing the detrimental effects that broad gene patents may
have on biotechnological progress, Professors Robert Merges and
225
Richard Nelson offer a solution. They argue that “scope limitations
based on close adherence to the inventor’s disclosure and judicious

219

See The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967,
107th Cong. (2002). In March of 2002, Rep. Lynn Rivers introduced the “Genomic
Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002,” aimed at addressing the
“troublesome” effects of gene patenting on biomedical research and patient care. 29
CONG. REC. E353 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Rivers). Among the
bill’s provisions is a subsection exempting from infringement liability the “use [of]
patented genetic sequence information for non-commercial research purposes.” Id.
at E354. Rep. Rivers likened this exemption to the “fair use” defense in copyright
law. Id.
220
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1204 (2002) (discussing the emergence of technologyspecific patent law doctrines).
221
See generally Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 66.
222
See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 392.
223
Arthur J. Gajarsa, Hon. Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture: The Fifth Annual
Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law, 6 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002).
224
See infra Part V for an examination of how a foreseeability-based limit on the
doctrine of equivalents can spur biotechnological innovation.
225
In their work on the economics of patent scope, Robert P. Merges and Richard
R. Nelson argue that the proper scope of patents is a dynamic, industry-based issue.
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at 880. With regard to science-based industries,
such as biotechnology, Merges and Nelson warn of the dangers that result from
“awarding overly broad patents early in the history of an industry founded on recent
scientific advances.” Id. at 915.
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use of the doctrine of equivalents provide the surest way around [the]
226
danger” of broad gene patents.
The Federal Circuit has already
acted to limit gene patents through “close adherence to the
227
by elevating the standards of written
inventor’s disclosure,”
description and enablement for biotechnology cases in Amgen v.
228
229
Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co., Fiers v. Revel, and Regents of the Univ. of
230
Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
This Comment proposes that the Federal
Circuit heed Merges and Nelson’s second piece of advice,
231
“[j]udicious use of the doctrine of equivalents,” and adopt a
biotechnology-specific version of the foreseeability standard
articulated in Judge Rader’s concurring opinion in Johnson & Johnston
232
Assocs., Inc.
In Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., the patentee claimed an
assembly of a printed circuit board “that prevent[ed] most damage
233
during manual handling.” The invention involved adhering fragile
copper foil used in the circuit board to a stiffer substrate sheet of
234
aluminum.
This construction allowed workers to handle the
aluminum, rather than the copper foil, during the production
process, thus preventing the damage to the copper circuits associated
235
with handling the copper foil directly. The specification identified
aluminum as the preferred material for the substrate, but also

226

See id.
Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at 915. See Alison E. Cantor, Using the Written
Description and Enablement Requirement to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 267 (2000) (discussing how the Federal Circuit has raised the bar with regard
to written description and enablement in an effort to limit the scope of gene based
patents); see also Emanuel Vacchiano, Comment, It’s a Wonderful Genome: The Written
Description Requirement Protects the Human Genome from Overly-Broad Patents, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 805 (1999) (discussing how the Federal Circuit has applied the
written description requirement to narrow gene patent scope); Margaret Sampson,
Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 35
U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233 (2000)
(discussing the current trend of the Federal Circuit to heighten both the enablement
and written description requirements for biotechnological inventions under 35
U.S.C. § 112).
228
See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
229
See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
230
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
231
Merges and Nelson’s second piece of advice for limiting gene patent scope is
“[j]udicious use of the doctrine of equivalents.” Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at
915.
232
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring).
233
Id. at 1049.
234
Id.
235
Id.
227
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identified that “other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloy,
236
may be used.”
Despite disclosing steel and nickel alloy, the
237
The accused
patentee only claimed aluminum as a substrate.
238
device used steel.
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit held that the accused patent
239
did not infringe. Notably, the court’s opinion settled an issue over
which Federal Circuit judges have long disagreed: whether subject
matter that is disclosed, but not claimed, is within the purview of the
240
doctrine of equivalents.
The court ruled that such subject matter
may not be captured through the doctrine of equivalents and is
241
dedicated to the public.
While concurring with the majority
opinion, Judge Rader, joined by Chief Judge Mayer, argued that the
court should have instead adopted a broader foreseeability bar to the
242
doctrine of equivalents.
Judge Rader articulated his foreseeability standard in a desire to
achieve a “better balance between the notice function of claims and
243
Under the
the protective function of non-textual infringement.”
foreseeability approach, the patentee “has an obligation to draft
claims that capture all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the
244
invention.”
If the claims do not “capture subject matter that the
245
patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen,” the patentee may
not rely on the doctrine of equivalents in extending the scope of his
246
Thus, with the exception of
claims beyond their literal meaning.
objectively unforeseeable subject matter, such as after arising
247
technology,
or subject matter “cloaked by the subtlety of
248
language,” the patent applicant may not broaden his claims to

236

Id. at 1050.
Id.
238
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1050.
239
Id. at 1055.
240
Joseph M O’Malley Jr. & Bruce M. Wexler, Battle Lines Form on Matter Disclosed
But Not Claimed, 227 N.Y. L.J. S4 (2002).
241
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1054-55.
242
Id. at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring).
243
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1059 (Rader, J., concurring).
244
Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring).
245
Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
246
Id. at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring).
247
Id. at 1058 (Rader, J., concurring) (citing Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus.,
Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents
applies to after-arising technology)). “After arising” technology refers to technology
that is developed after the claims are drafted. Lawrence M. Sung, On Treating Past as
Prologue, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 75, 81 n.29 (2001).
248
Id. (quoting Sage Prods., Inc., 126 F.3d at 1425).
237
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reach objectively foreseeable, yet unclaimed subject matter.
250
Compared to the Supreme Court’s Festo
pronouncement
regarding prosecution history esoppel, the foreseeability standard is
an even greater restraint on a patentee’s ability to broaden his claims
through the doctrine of equivalents. It is so highly limiting because it
applies to the claims as originally drafted, regardless of whether they
251
252
are amended, and thus before prosecution history estoppel arises.
Consequently, under a foreseeability approach, the patentee is
precluded from using the doctrine of equivalents to capture any
253
foreseeable, yet unclaimed subject matter, notwithstanding a lack of
prosecution history estoppel.
Although Judge Rader spoke generally about the desirability of
limiting the doctrine of equivalents via a foreseeability standard, he
254
This
did not speak in terms of biotechnology or gene patents.
comment, however, argues for a biotechnology–specific application
of the foreseeability standard. It examines the legal authority for
applying a heightened, more restrictive version of the doctrine of
equivalents in biotechnology patent cases. It seeks to highlight both
how and why a biotechnology specific, foreseeability-based limitation
on the doctrine of equivalents would prevent broad reaching gene
patents, thereby contributing to biotechnological innovation.

A. The Foreseeability-Based Limitation is Consistent with Recent
Patent Law Precedent Limiting the Availability of the Doctrine of
Equivalents
The foreseeability approach, which restricts a patentee’s access
to the doctrine of equivalents, is in accord with recent Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court decisions generally limiting the doctrine’s
249

See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring).
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722; see supra text accompanying notes 144-48 for a
discussion of Festo.
251
See supra note 142 for the difference between original and amended claims.
252
Jessica L. Bagner & Steven J. Rizzi, Litigating Infringement Under the Doctrine of
Equivalents After Festo, 721 PLI/PAT 345, 365 (2002) (examining Festo and the
implications of a foreseeability standard in guiding the application of prosecution
history estoppel). Prosecution history estoppel precludes the patentee from
capturing subject matter lost through amendment. See supra text accompanying
notes 142-48. In contrast, the foreseeability approach applies to the original claims
before they are amended, and thus before prosecution history estoppel becomes
applicable. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J.,
concurring). See supra note 142 for a discussion of patent prosecution.
253
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring).
254
Id.
250
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255

applicability.
The holdings in Pennwault Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,
256
257
Inc. and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. made it
more difficult to prove non-textual infringement by requiring a
patentee to show equivalence for every element in the claim, not just
the claim as a whole. In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey &
258
Assocs., the Federal Circuit again limited the doctrine in holding
259
Further, the courtthat it cannot be used to embrace prior art.
260
created doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, a major limitation
on the doctrine of equivalents, prevents the patentee from claiming
equivalence for any amendment related to patentability made during
261
the patent’s prosecution. Finally, in Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc.,
the Federal Circuit held that subject matter disclosed but not
claimed, “perhaps the ultimate example of subject matter that is
262
263
foreseeable,” may not be reached by the doctrine of equivalents.
Also, the Federal Circuit has, on occasion, used a foreseeability
264
approach to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
265
For instance, in Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that the doctrine of equivalents may not be used to
266
capture foreseeable modifications to a claimed invention.
According to the court, “a skilled patent drafter would foresee the
267
The court
limiting potential of the ‘over said slot’ limitation.”
stressed that the patentee could have sought claims with fewer
structural limitations if it wanted broad patent protection but instead
“left the PTO with manifestly limited claims that it now seeks to
268
expand through the doctrine of equivalents.”
Thus, the court
declared, “as between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to
negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it

255

Id. at 1056-57 (Rader, J., concurring).
Pennwault Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
257
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40.
258
904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
259
Id. at 683.
260
See supra text accompanying notes 142-48 for an overview of prosecution
history estoppel.
261
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 734-40.
262
See Sandonato & Wischhusen, supra note 143, at A19.
263
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1054-55.
264
See id. at 1057-58 (Rader, J., concurring).
265
The patent at issue in Sage involved a system for safely disposing of sharp
medical instruments. See Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1422.
266
Id. at 1425 (noting that “[i]t is the patentee who must bear the cost of its
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure”).
267
Id.
268
Id.
256
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is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection
269
for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”
B. The Foreseeability Standard is Consistent with Federal Circuit
Precedent Creating Heightened, Biotechnology-Specific Patent Law
Principles for Preventing Broad Gene Patents
A biotechnology-specific application of the foreseeability
standard would be consistent with recent Federal Circuit precedent
270
employing biotechnology-specific means to limit gene patent scope.
In particular, the Federal Circuit has adopted elevated standards of
271
272
enablement and written description for biotechnology patents, in
273
These
an attempt to limit claims to gene-based inventions.
heightened patentability standards for biotechnology patents are set
274
275
276
forth in Amgen, Fiers and Eli Lilly.
One of the Federal Circuit’s most notable decisions involving the
use of the enablement requirement to limit biotechnology patent
277
claims is Amgen.
In Amgen, the plaintiff, Amgen, and defendant
both held patents on technology relevant to the production of
erythropoietin (“EPO”), a protein responsible for stimulating the
278
production of red blood cells.
Amgen’s patent was for a
279
Amgen claimed all possible
recombinant DNA version of EPO.
DNA sequences coding for functional equivalents or “analogs” of the
280
human EPO protein. EPO analogs were defined as those proteins
having the biological properties of normal EPO, “but encoded for by
281
a DNA sequence different than the normal EPO DNA sequence.”
282
In its decision, the Federal Circuit invalidated claim 7, which
269

Id.
See supra note 227.
271
See supra text accompanying notes 111-14 for an overview of the enablement
requirement.
272
See supra text accompanying notes 107-10 for an overview of the written
description requirement.
273
See supra note 227.
274
See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1200.
275
See Fiers, 984 F.3d at 1164.
276
See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1559.
277
See Cantor, supra note 227, at 291.
278
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1203-04.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 1204.
281
Sampson, supra note 227, at 1241 (interpreting claim 7 in Amgen).
282
Claim 7 was directed to:
270

A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a
DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid
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was directed to “[a] purified and isolated DNA sequence,” for lack of
283
enablement.
According to the court, Amgen had not disclosed
enough information to enable one skilled in the art to predictably
produce DNA sequences coding for EPO analogs with EPO-like
284
activity.
Whereas one could read Amgen’s patent to claim
thousands, if not millions, of DNA sequences, Amgen had only
285
generated fifty to eighty analogs. Regarding the analogs, an Amgen
scientist testified that he could not say whether they possessed the
286
same biological properties as human EPO.
As a result, the court
concluded that “mak[ing] the gene and disclos[ing] a handful of
analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained,” is not
sufficient to claim “all of the gene sequences that have EPO-like
287
activity.”
Significantly, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amgen limits an
inventor’s ability to obtain broad gene patents by claiming every
288
biologically active variation of a gene’s DNA sequence.
While an
inventor “may be able to write down the possible variations of a
gene’s DNA sequence, unless the inventor can reliably predict the
effect of the variations on the activity of the encoded protein, the
inventor has no right to claim all biologically significant analogs of a
289
gene.”
In addition to the enablement requirement of § 112, a patent
specification must also contain a written description describing the
invention in “sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly
290
conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention.”
Whereas a generic statement describing the invention is usually
sufficient with regard to chemical materials, such has not been the
291
case with genetic material.
An adequate written description of a
DNA sequence “requires more than a mere statement that it is part of
sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to allow
possession of the biological property of causing bone marrow cells
to increase production of reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to
increase hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204.
283

Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1213-14.
285
Id. at 1213 (noting the district court’s findings).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 1214.
288
See Sampson, supra note 227, at 1242.
289
Id.
290
See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d
1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
291
See id. at 1568.
284
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the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it;
292
what is required is a description of the DNA itself.” Thus, whereas
constructive reduction to practice is usually sufficient to satisfy this
requirement, the Federal Circuit has heightened the written
description requirement for biotechnology by requiring a description
293
of the DNA itself.
In Fiers, the Federal Circuit heard an appeal from a three-way
interference action in the USPTO between Sugano, Revel and Fiers
294
regarding conflicting claims to a gene coding for beta interferon.
Fiers’s patent application disclosed a method for isolating the DNA
sequence coding for beta-interferon, which experts testified was
adequate to allow one skilled in the art to isolate beta-interferon
295
without undue experimentation. The court, however, relying on its
reasoning in Amgen, ruled that Fiers was not the first to conceive this
method because he had not defined the gene other than by its
296
biological function or activity.
As for Revel, the court ruled his
297
application invalid for lack of a satisfactory written description.
While Revel disclosed methods for isolating the DNA coding for betainterferon, he did not disclose a complete DNA sequence coding for
298
beta-interferon.
The court reasoned that a satisfactory written
description for DNA must contain the same degree of specificity
299
required to prove conception.
Thus, according to the court, a
method for isolating beta-interferon without disclosure of the
300
complete nucleotide sequence does not suffice. The court awarded
priority to Sugano, whose application disclosed a method for isolating
the DNA sequence as well as the DNA’s complete nucleotide
301
sequence.
In 1997, the Federal Circuit created an even higher written
description standard for biotechnology inventions in The Regents of
302
California v. Eli Lilly.
In Eli Lilly, the patent at issue related to
recombinant plasmids and microorganisms that produce human

292

Id. at 1566-67.
See Arriola, supra note 204, at 937.
294
Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1166-68.
295
Id. at 1167.
296
Id. at 1169.
297
Id. at 1170-71.
298
Id.
299
Id. at 1171.
300
Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170-71.
301
Id. at 1167.
302
See Arriola, supra note 204, at 936 (discussing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
293
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304

insulin. The patent featured broad claims for cDNA coding for
305
human, vertebrate and mammalian insulin, and disclosed the
306
The patent application
relevant cDNA sequence for rat insulin.
307
also disclosed a general method for obtaining human cDNA.
According to the court, while the specification supported a claim to
cDNA coding for rat insulin, it did not support a broader claim for
human insulin or the genus claim covering the cDNA of vertebrates
308
or mammals.
Building on Fiers, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an adequate
written description of a DNA sequence requires more than a
description of the protein for which it encodes or a method for
309
The court opined that the specification did not
preparing it.
adequately describe the claim to human insulin because, while the
specification described a method for preparing human insulin cDNA,
310
it failed to provide the actual nucleotide sequence of human cDNA.
As for the genus claims, the court found the description of rat insulin
insufficient to describe the broad classes of vertebrate or mammalian
311
insulin cDNA.
C. A Biotechnology-Specific Foreseeability Limit on the Doctrine of
Equivalents will Reinforce the Federal Circuit’s Goal of Limiting
Gene Patent Scope
A biotechnology-specific application of the objective
foreseeability standard will complement and further buttress the
Federal Circuit’s purpose in raising the biotech patentability bar: the
312
prevention of overly broad gene-based patents.
In Amgen, the
Federal Circuit used a heightened enablement standard to prevent
the patentee from claiming all DNA sequences coding for EPO
313
analogs. In Eli Lilly and Fiers, the Federal Circuit raised the bar for
written description to prevent applicants from demonstrating
303

Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562.
Complementary DNA (cDNA) is DNA that is synthesized using mRNA as a
template. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 525-26. Through this process, known as
reverse transcription, scientists can isolate the original gene minus its non-coding
regions. Id.
305
See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1567-69.
306
Id. at 1566-69.
307
Id. at 1567.
308
Id. at 1566-69.
309
Id. at 1567.
310
See id.
311
Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
312
See supra note 227.
313
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1214.
304
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possession of the claimed invention until they could describe the
314
exact DNA sequence.
If adopted, a biotechnology-specific,
foreseeability-based limitation on the doctrine of equivalents will
further prevent inventors from broadening claims to DNA-based
patents.
315
As things currently stand after Festo, inventors seeking to patent
gene-based inventions face two major hurdles: prosecution history
316
estoppel and the elevated standards of written description and
317
That is, patent applicants wish to protect their
enablement.
318
inventions by claiming all variants, i.e., analogs of the invention.
The heightened standards of enablement and written description,
319
however, inevitably preclude broadly claiming all of the variants.
Further, once the enablement or written description rejection is
made, prosecution history estoppel will prevent capturing those
320
variants through the doctrine of equivalents.
Thus, the applicant
will be left with the literal and narrower language of the original
321
claims.
To avoid this possibility, commentators suggest claiming an
invention narrowly, in order to avoid prosecution history estoppel,
and attempting to broaden the claims through the doctrine of
322
equivalents.
A foreseeability limit, however, prevents the patentee
from employing these means to broaden gene patent scope because
it applies to the original claims as drafted, regardless of the existence
323
of prosecution history estoppel.
Thus, once the patentee foresees a
314

See Sampson, supra note 273, at 1258-65 (offering an overview of how the
Federal Circuit has applied a heightened standard of written description).
315
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722.
316
See supra text accompanying notes 142-48 for an overview of prosecution
history estoppel.
317
See supra note 227.
318
See Arriola, supra note 204, at 944.
319
Id. at 944 (referring to the “all too common written description and
enablement rejection”).
320
Id. This result occurs because any amendment related to patentability gives
rise to prosecution history estoppel. See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722, 735-77. Thus, once
the patent applicant narrows his claims in response to an enablement or written
description rejection (an amendment related to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 112),
prosecution history estoppel prevents broadening the claims to capture the subject
matter lost in amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48 for an
overview of prosecution history estoppel.
321
See supra note 320.
322
See John M. Benassi & Kurt M. Kjelland, Still Not the Same as it Ever Was . . .
Proving Infringement After the Supreme Court’s Festo Decision, 721 PLI/PAT 253, 306
(2002); see also Arriola, supra note 204, at 945 (making this suggestion in the context
of the complete bar announced by the Federal Circuit in Festo I).
323
See Bagner & Rizzi, supra note 252, at 365.
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particular DNA sequence, protein or analog, he must draft his claims
324
to include such material.
If the applicant fails to claim this
foreseeable subject matter, by narrowly claiming the invention with
an eye to broadening through the doctrine of equivalents, he will fall
325
prey to the foreseeability standard.
By deliberately claiming a
subset of possibilities, the applicant recognized and chose not to
326
claim foreseeable subject matter. Thus, he knowingly drew the line
and is precluded from resorting to the doctrine of equivalents to later
327
capture such subject matter.
Further, in requiring the patentee “to draft claims that capture
328
all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention,” the
329
foreseeable standard places quite a burden on the claims drafter.
With regard to claims to DNA sequences and their proteins, the
patent applicant faces the formidable task of having to claim all
330
objectively foreseeable variants of the sequence or protein.
Although Judge Rader did not provide explicit guidance as to what
constitutes objective foreseeability, the Federal Circuit recently
delineated such a standard in its latest Festo pronouncement, on
331
According to the court,
remand from the Supreme Court.
objective foreseeability is determined from the perspective of one
332
skilled in the art. The Federal Circuit further expounded that if an
equivalent is known in the relevant prior art, “it certainly [should] be
333
foreseeable.”
324

See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring)
(noting that “when one of ordinary skill in the art would foresee coverage of an
invention, a patent drafter has an obligation to claim those foreseeable limits”).
325
See id. at 1058 (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting Sage Prods., 126 F.3d 1420 (“As
between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but
did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”)).
326
See James Pooley & Marc David Peter, Proof of Equivalence After Festo: The Impact
of Foresight, 725 PLI/PAT 101, 107 (2002) (examining the role and application of
foresight on the doctrine of equivalents after Festo).
327
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring)
(noting “the doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent
drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the application process and included
in the claims”).
328
Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring).
329
See id. (noting the premium that the foreseeability standard places on claims
drafting).
330
See id. (noting the “objective standard” set by foreseeability).
331
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
332
Id.
333
Id. (citing Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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In patent law, the person of ordinary skill in the art possesses
334
knowledge of every relevant prior art reference. Thus, gene patent
applicants face an uphill battle when arguing that the subject matter
they failed to claim was objectively unforeseeable. Under the Federal
Circuit’s most recent foreseeability analysis in Festo, subject matter is
335
likely objectively foreseeable if it exists in the relevant prior art.
Thus, applicants who fail to claim a sequence, protein or variant
either deliberately, by mistake or because it was unknown to them at
the time of invention, each a real possibility given the breadth of
336
biotechnology prior art, may very well be precluded from arguing
that the material was unforeseeable and thus reachable by the
337
doctrine of equivalents.
338

D. The “Premium” that the Foreseeability Approach Places on Notice
will Serve to Further Spur Biotechnological Innovation
The doctrine of equivalents, while allowing patentees to bring
non-literal infringement claims, also creates a level of uncertainty
339
among competitors. Given that “claims, like the words with which
340
they are written, are inherently imprecise,” competitors can never
be sure whether their activities are safe from infringement suits
341
under the doctrine of equivalents. This leads to increased risk and
decreased incentives to invent technologies that may infringe the
342
outer, undefined boundary of other patent claims. Arguably, such
uncertainty is further magnified in biotechnology, a field
characterized by a proliferation of intellectual property rights
334

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 220, at 1188 (citing In re Winslow, 365 F.2d
1017 (C.C.P.A. 1966)).
335
Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369 (citing Pioneer Magnetics, Inc., 330 F.3d at 1357).
336
See Arriola, supra note 273, at 942-43 (noting that “[m]any molecular
manipulations involved in the quest for scientific discoveries, although scientifically
complex, are something more akin to routine testing in the field,” and that “it is no
longer a novel concept for scientists to ‘design’ functional equivalents”); see also
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 306 (commenting how technologies such as
gene cloning, computer controlled sequencing machines, and polymerase chain
reactions have significantly increased scientists’ ability to rapidly locate and sequence
commercially valuable genes).
337
See Bagner & Rizzi, supra note 252, at 305.
338
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring)
(noting that the foreseeability standard places a “premium on notice”).
339
See Sandonato & Wischhusen, supra note 143, at A19.
340
Id.
341
See Mathew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1045, 1058 (2001) (arguing for a foreseeable approach to prosecution history
estoppel).
342
Id.
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regarding the fundamental biochemicals needed for research.
Under a foreseeability limit on the doctrine of equivalents,
which disallows equivalence for objectively foreseeable yet unclaimed
subject matter, the claims become “the sole definition of invention
344
scope in all foreseeable circumstances.”
Thus, competitors in the
biotechnology industry need only consult the claims for reliable
345
guidance regarding what does and does not infringe the patent. In
providing clearer boundaries regarding infringement, the
foreseeability standard eliminates some of the risks associated with
new product development in this age of intellectual property right
346
proliferation. Hopefully, this decreased level of risk will translate to
increased incentives to develop innovative technologies.
Further, although the foreseeability standard makes claims “the
sole definition of invention scope,” it does not harm the patentee by
347
providing competitors with a “blueprint” for avoiding infringement.
As noted by various commentators, “[w]here foreseeability is found,
the patentee is deemed to have intended to abandon that particular
equivalent, and thus neither patent law nor equity is offended by the
348
competitor’s use of the equivalent subject matter . . . .”
CONCLUSION
Advances in molecular biology, genomics, and proteomics will
continue to spawn new drugs, therapeutics and other
biotechnological innovations that change the way humans encounter
349
life.
In order to maintain this era of biotechnological innovation,
the USPTO and Federal Circuit must remain mindful of the harm
that broad gene patents may have on biotechnology, health care and
350
biomedical research. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit and USPTO
must continue to limit claims to gene-based inventions. Already, the
Federal Circuit has raised the bar of patentability for biotechnology

343

See supra text accompanying notes 162-71 for a discussion of biotechnology
patent proliferation and the manner in which such blocking patents threaten to
impede scientific progress.
344
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
345
See id.
346
Mathew J. Conigliaro et al., supra note 341, at 1071.
347
Id. (addressing this concern with regard to a foreseeability approach to
prosecution history estoppel).
348
Id.
349
See supra Part II for an overview of the biotechnology industry and its current
scientific focus.
350
See supra Part IV for an analysis of the detrimental effects of broad gene
patents.
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patents through heightened standards of enablement and written
351
description.
The Federal Circuit should further act to prevent
broad gene-based patents by adopting a biotech-specific,
352
foreseeability-based limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
Through superior notice and decreased opportunities to broaden
claims beyond their literal meaning, the foreseeability limit could
prove an effective patent law mechanism for preventing broad gene
patents and promoting biotechnological progress.

351

See supra note 227 and Part V.B for an analysis of Federal Circuit case law
elevating the enablement and written description requirements for biotechnology
patent cases.
352
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).

